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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JERALD WIXOM GREAVES, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was a declaratory judgment action filed 
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1, 2 (1953), against the 
State of Utah complaining that Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44.2 (Supp. 1973) and 41-2-18 (Supp. 1973), are uncon-
stitutional. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In the District Court of the First Judicial District, 
in and for Cache County, State of Utah, on February 26, 
1974, Judge Venoy Christofferson found Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44.2 (Supp. 1973), unconstitutional. He made no 
ruling on the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 41-
2-18 (Supp. 1973). 
Case No. 
13631 
\ 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the decision and order 
of Judge Christofferson declaring Section 41-6-44.2, supra, 
unconstitutional, or in the alternative a remand of the 
case to the lower court so that a full and complete hear-
ing on the merits of the case may be obtained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The proceedings in this case were initiated by the 
filing of a complaint by respondent on November 23, 
1973, in the First District Court complaining that two 
statutes under which he had been charged were uncon-
stitutional. However, the defendant had not been charged 
in the District Court, but rather, in the Logan City 
Court. For this reason, the complaint filed on Novem-
ber 23, also asked for a stay of the proceedings in the 
city court pending a determination by the district court 
of the constitutionality of the statutes in question. 
The respondent in this case, Jerald Greaves, was 
arrested on August 1,1973, by a Logan City police officer 
and was charged with driving while under the influence 
of alcohol under Section 42-6-1, Logan City Ordinance. 
Respondent pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial 
was set for September 24, 1973, in Logan City Court. 
Just prior to the trial date, Logan City dismissed the 
complaint and then charged respondent with the same 
offense under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2 (Supp. 1973). 
Apparently, the police officers had taken a blood alcohol 
test of respondent's blood, and it was alleged in the com-
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plaint filed by respondent in the district court that the 
state would attempt to introduce the results of said test 
in evidence at the trial, and that the results of the test 
allegedly showed a .12 percent blood alcohol content. (See 
Complaint, p. 1.) 
It was on the basis of this new charge that respon-
dent filed the complaint in District Court asking for the 
stay of the lower court proceedings and alleging that the 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supra, was uncon-
stitutional as applied to him. The State of Utah, repre-
sented by the Attorney General, made a motion for a 
more definite statement which was granted by Judge 
Venoy Christofferson of the First District Court. An 
amended complaint was filed by respondent, and the 
Attorney General responded to this amended complaint 
with a motion to dismiss predicated largely upon pro-
cedural allegations and this motion was answered by a 
memorandum from the respondent. 
After the filing of appellant's motion to dismiss and 
respondent's memorandum, both parties were awaiting 
a decision on the motion and anticipating the setting of 
a trial date in the event the motion to dismiss was denied. 
No hearing or oral argument was held on the motion pur-
suant to Rule 13 of the First District Court (see Appen-
dix No. 1). Instead of ruling on the motion, Judge Chris-
tofferson rendered a memorandum decision on the merits 
of the case without holding a hearing on the matter. Thus, 
appellant never had the opportunity to argue the merits 
of the case in open court, and for that matter, never 
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received a specific ruling on his motion to dismiss. Ap-
pellant immediately filed a notice of appeal to this Court. 
Subsequently, the respondent prepared an order 
which should have been in conformance with the Court's 
Memorandum Decision. This order did not conform to 
the Court's decision, but was based upon other grounds. 
For this reason, appellant prepared a motion to strike 
the order and also submitted a new order which Judge 
Christofferson determined to be in accordance with his 
decision and which he subsequently signed. 
The respondent filed a memorandum opposing appel-
lant's motion to strike and appellant's order, but the 
judge refused to reconsider the matter. Thus, the order 
submitted by appellant has been signed and approved 
by the judge of the lower court as an accurate statement 
of his holding. The appellant in this case now appeals 
Judge Christofferson's ruling that Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44.2, supra, is unconstitutional. More specifically, 
appellant appeals from Judge Christofferson's holding 
expressed in the following Memorandum Decision (quoted 
in its entirety): 
"The plaintiff herein has asked the court 
for a declaratory judgment asking the court to 
declare unconstitutional Section 41-6-44.2 of 
the Utah State Code, wherein such provides as 
follows: 
"I t is unlawful and punishable as provided 
in subsection (b) of this section for any person 
with a blood alcohol content of .10 per cent or 
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greater by weight to drive or be in actual physi-
cal control of any vehicle within this state." 
Section 41-6-44, which has not been repealed, 
states: 
" I t is unlawful and punishable as pro-
vided in subsection (d) for any person who is 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor to 
drive or be in actual physical control of any 
vehicle within this state." 
and then sets up certain presumptive stand-
ards. Section 41-6-44.2 states only that if it is 
proved that your blood alcohol content is .10 
per cent or greater by weight it is unlawful 
to drive a vehicle, with no relation to how the 
blood alcohol content of .10 per cent or greater 
by weight is achieved—that is, by drinking in-
toxicating liquor. 
I t is the opinion that there must be stated 
in the statute some relation of the blood alcohol 
content being .10 per cent or greater to some 
act of the person so charged, such as drinking 
intoxicating liquor. There are ways, of course, 
in which a person could have .10 per cent by 
weight of alcohol in his blood with no criminal 
intent involved or even knowledge of the .10 
per cent, yet this statute makes it an offense 
simply by that fact alone. For example, a 
person's physican may advise him to take Ny-
quil for a cold or whatever is experienced to 
give relief for a cold, which is twenty-five per 
cent alcohol or fifty proof, and I am sure other 
medical remedies are available with greater 
or lesser amounts of alcohol that could cause 
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a person to be in violation of this statute, or 
even possibly some prescriptions, injections or 
otherwise by a doctor could cause the same re-
sult. 
The court, therefore, declares the statute 
is unconstitutional for vagueness. Counsel for 
the plaintiff is requested to prepare an order 
in conformance with this Memorandum Deci-
sion. D A T E D February 26, 1974." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IT IS NOT A REQUIREMENT, EITHER OF 
THE STATE OR FEDERAL CONSTITU-
TION, THAT A STATUTE EXPRESS OR 
REQUIRE MENS REA AS A NECESSARY 
ELEMENT OF A CRIME SUCH AS THE 
ONE IN QUESTION. 
The memorandum decision rendered by Judge Chris-
tofferson may be interpreted in one sense as declaring 
the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2 (Supp. 1973), 
unconstitutional because it does not require an act of a 
person to constitute a crime. Point III, infra, will show 
that an act of the person is in fact required by the stat-
ute before a crime is committed. However, the other, 
more likely interpretation of the decision is that the 
statute is unconstitutional because it does not express 
or require criminal intent as a necessary element of the 
crime. This interpretation is buttressed by the court's 
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statement, "There are ways, of course, in which a person 
could have .10 percent by weight of alcohol in his blood 
with no criminal intent involved or even knowledge of 
the .10 percent, yet this statute makes it an offense 
simply by that fact alone." (Emphasis added.) P. 1, 
Memorandum Decision. 
The United States Supreme Court, as well as this 
Court, has long recognized a particular class of crimes 
which, because of the potential damage to the public 
welfare which can result from doing or neglecting to do 
a certain act, have not required criminal intent as an 
element of the crime. A very good discussion of history 
surrounding this development is found in Morissette 
v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 96 L. Ed. 288, 72 S. Ct. 
240 (1952), beginning at 72 S. Ct. 243. The point is made, 
that while traditionally all crimes required some kind of 
mens rea, scienter, or criminal intent to signify evil pur-
pose or mental culpability, there has been a tendency 
in the last hundred years or so to formulate new duties 
and crimes which disregard any ingredient of intent. 
The reason for this development and the situations 
to which it applies are stated here in the words of the 
Court: 
"The industrial revolution multiplied the 
number of workmen exposed to injury from in-
creasingly powerful and complex mechanisms, 
driven by freshly discovered sources of energy, 
requiring higher precautions by employers. 
Traffic of velocities, volumes and varieties un-
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heard of came to subject the wayfarer to in-
tolerable casualty risks if owner and drivers 
were not to observe new cares and uniformities 
of conduct. Congestion of cities and crowding 
of quarters called for health and welfare regu-
lations undereamed of in simpler times. Wide 
distribution of goods became an instrument of 
wide distribution of harm when those who dis-
persed food, drink, drugs, and even securities, 
did not comply with reasonable standards of 
quality, integrity, disclosure and care. Such 
dangers have engendered increasingly numer-
ous and detailed regulations which heighten 
the duties of those in control of particular in-
dustries, trade, properties or activities that 
affect public health, safety or welfare. 
While many of these duties are sanctioned 
by a more strict civil liability, lawmakers, 
whether wisely or not, have sought to make such 
regulations more effective by invoking crimi-
nal sanctions to be applied by the familiar tech-
nique of criminal prosecutions and convictions. 
This has confronted the courts with a multi-
tude of prosecutions, based on statutes or ad-
ministrative regulations, for what have been 
aptly called "public welfare offenses." These 
cases do not fit neatly into any of such accepted 
classifications of common-law offenses, such 
as those against the state, the person, property, 
or public morals. Many of these offenses are 
not in the nature of positive aggressions or in-
vasions, with which the common law so often 
dealt, but are in the nature of neglect where 
the law requires care, or inaction where it im-
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poses a duty. Many violations of such regula-
tions result in no direct or immediate injury 
to person or property but merely create the 
danger or probability of it which the law seeks 
to minimize. While such offenses do not 
threaten the security of the state in the man-
ner of treason, they may be regarded as of-
fenses against its authority, for their occurrence 
impairs the efficiency of controls deemed es-
sential to the social order as presently consti-
tuted. In this respect, whatever the intent of 
the violator, the injury is the same, and the con-
sequences are injurious or not according to 
fortuity. Hence, legislation applicable to such 
offenses, as a matter of policy, does not specify 
intent as a necessary element. The accused, if 
he does not will the violation, usually is in a 
position to prevent it with no more care than 
society might reasonably expect and no more 
exertion than it might reasonably exact from 
one who assumed his responsibilities. Also, pen-
alties commonly are relatively small, and con-
viction does no grave damage to an offender's 
reputation." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 245-
246. 
The court then goes on to hold that a state which pro-
hibits the embezzlement or stealing of public property 
and does not specifically eliminate intent as an element 
will be construed as requiring intent. But, the important 
point for our purposes is that there is a class of crimes 
for which intent is not a necessary element. The Court 
in Morissette, supra, specifically sustains the rulings in 
three earlier Supreme Court cases which had not required 
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intent in respect to particular crimes. Those cases were: 
United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250, 66 L. Ed. 604, 42 
S. Ct. 301 (1922); United States v. Behrman, 258 U. S. 
280, 66 L. Ed. 619, 42 S. Ct. 303 (1922); and, United 
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277, 88 L. Ed. 48, 64 S. 
Ct. 134 (1943). All of these cases dealt with Federal 
statutes and dealt with drug and foods, therefore meeting 
the requirement that they be "public welfare" offenses. 
A more recent case dealing with Federal regulations is 
United States v. International Minerals & Chemical 
Corp., 402 U. S. 558, 29 L. Ed. 2d 178, 9 IS. Ct. 1697 
(1971). The Court there acknowledged the line of cases 
mentioned above by saying: There is leeway for the 
exercise of congressional discretion in applying the reach 
of "mens rear 91 S. Ct. at 1701. 
There is no federal constitutional requirement, at 
least so far as Congress is concerned, that all crimes con-
tain a "criminal intent" element. There is a recognized 
class of crimes for which it is not necessary. The court 
has not laid down a precise line of demarcation between 
the two classes, but there are two classes: 
"Neither this Court nor, so far as we are 
aware, any other has undertaken to delineate 
a precise line or set forth comprehensive cri-
teria for distinguishing between crimes that re-
quire a mental element and crimes that do not. 
We attempt no closed definition, for the law 
on the subject is neither settled nor static. The 
conclusion reached in the Balint and Behrman 
cases has our approval and adherence for the 
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circumstances to which it was there applied." 
Morissette v. United States, 72 S.Ct. at 248. 
The next question is to determine what restraints, 
if any, are placed on the states by the federal constitu-
tion as to whether they can pass statutes not requiring 
mens rea as an element of a crime. A fairly recent United 
States Supreme Court case, Smith v. People of the State 
of California, 361 U. S. 147, 4 L. Ed. 2d 205, 80 S. Ct. 215 
(1960), rehearing denied, 361 U. S. 950, 4 L. Ed. 2d 383, 
80 S. Ct. 399, held: 
" . . . it is doubtless competent for the 
states to create strict criminal liabilities by de-
fining criminal offenses without any element 
of scienter though . . . there is precedent in this 
Court that the power is not without limita-
tion." Id. at 217. 
A more recent case, Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 20 
L. Ed. 2d 1254, 88 S. Ct. 2145 (1968), points out: 
" . . . this Court has never articulated a 
general constitutional doctrine of mens rea. 
We cannot cast aside the centuries-long 
evolution of the collection of interlocking and 
overlapping concepts which the common law 
has utilized to assess the moral accountability 
of an individual for his antisocial deeds. The 
doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, 
mistake, justification, and duress have histori-
cally provided the tools for a constantly shift-
ing adjustment of the tension between the 
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evolving aims of the criminal law and changing 
religious, moral, philosophical, and medical 
views of the nature of man. This process of ad-
justment has always been thought to be the pro-
vince of the States/' (Emphasis added.) Id. at 
2156. 
While there may be some limitations on the state 
power to enact strict criminal liability statutes, it is gen-
erally within the province of the states to make these 
determinations. The Powell decision appears to be the 
most recent relevant pronouncement of the Supreme 
Court on the question of what requirements the Consti-
tution imposes on the states in respect to mens rea. The 
problem has not yet been totally clarified on the federal 
level, see United States v. International Minerals, supra, 
and United States v. Freed, 401 U. S. 601, 28 L. Ed. 2d 
356, 91 S. Ct. 1112 (1971), but at least the states are 
free to fashion crimes which do not require scienter. 
Some recent state decisions recognizing this fact are: 
State v. Vietor, 208 N. W. 2d 894 (Iowa 1973); State v. 
Medlin, 273 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1973); Gregory v. State, 291 
N. E. 2d 67 (Ind. 1973); State v. Husser, 290 A. 2d 425 
(R. 1.1972); Wright v. State, 236 So. 2d 408 (Miss. 1970); 
Coats v. Commonwealth, 469 S. W. 2d 346 (Kent. 1971). 
While it is recognized that certain states have res-
ervations about so-called strict liability crimes, this Court 
has recognized such crimes. State v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 
2d 314, 333 P. 2d 1075 (1959), dealt with a similar ques-
tion. The defendant in this case claimed "that the legis-
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lature had substituted the status of being under the in-
fluence of drugs or liquor for criminal intent formerly 
required before one could be convicted of a felony." Id. 
at 1077. 
The Court answered this argument by saying: 
"So far as the question of the present 
statute being unlawfully discriminatory is 
concerned, this court has held that all that 
is required is that the statute apply equally 
to all members in the class and that as long as 
there is a valid reason for a classification by 
the legislature, their determination of the class 
will not be disturbed. Neither, so far as we 
are aware, is there any constitutional prohibi-
tion against legislative substitution of an ad-
mittedly unlawful status for the required 
criminal intent in a felony prosecution. For 
example, criminal intent is not necessary to 
support a conviction of unlawful cohabita-
tion." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 1077. 
The precedent for this statement is found in State 
v. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P. 2d 647 (1944), a bigamy 
case in which the defendant claimed that since he felt 
that having more than one wife was not evil, but rather 
God-inspired, he could not have the necessary criminal 
intent to violate the statute. I t is quite clear in this state 
that the legislature may enact statutes which may be 
violated without the element of criminal intent. 
While the particular statute presently in issue has 
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not been before the court, other similar statutes have 
been. In 1930, the Court, in State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 
84, 287 P. 909 (1930), said: 
"Operating an automobile on a public 
street or highway by one under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor is itself an unlawful act 
and an offense... ." 
Furthermore, this Court said in State v. Brennan, 
13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P. 2d 27 (1962), "It is within the 
prerogative of the legislature to make it unlawful for 
one to drive a vehicle while under the influence of liquor 
. . ." Id. at 29. It will be recalled that the United States 
Supreme Court, in talking about the class of crimes which 
did not require intent, referred to them as "public welfare 
offenses." See Morissette v. United States, 72 S. Ct. at 
246. This Court has clearly categorized statutes prohibit-
ing persons from driving under the influence of alcohol 
as being in this realm. The court in Salt Lake City v. 
Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P. 2d 671 (1939), characterized 
driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor as "def-
initely and closely related to the safety of the inhabitants 
and the preservation of property." Id. at 672. Thus, a 
crime which consists of driving while intoxicated can cer-
tainly be classified as a "public welfare offense." See 
also United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F. 2d 437 (3d Cir. 
1943): 
"Where the offense prohibited and made 
punishable are capable of inflicting widespread 
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injury, and where the requirement of proof 
of the offender's guilty knowledge and wrong-
ful intent would render enforcement of the 
prohibition difficult if not impossible (i.e., in 
effect tend to nullify the statute), the legisla-
tive intent to dispense with mens rea as an 
element of the offense has justifiable basis." 
As will be shown later, there is good cause for the 
legislature to prohibit a person from driving while his 
blood alcohol content is .10 percent or higher. The dan-
ger to property and life is readily apparent when it is 
shown that substantial impairment of a person's ability 
to drive results from that much alcohol being present 
in his system. 
The conclusion must be that it is clearly within the 
prerogative of the legislature to enact statutes not re-
quiring proof of mens rea or criminal intent. This is es-
pecially true in situations which may have a significant 
impact on the public, the so-called "public welfare of-
fenses." The dangers to the public are readily apparent 
from the medical and statistical evidence which has been 
accumulated in respect to alcohol-related offenses and the 
impairment of a driver's faculties when there is .10 per-
cent of alcohol in his blood. (See Point V.) 
Finally, the lower court's statement that a person's 
blood alcohol level could reach the statutory level as a 
result of that person taking prescribed medication with-
out the person having criminal intent is irrelevant. The 
fact remains that such persons still present a danger to 
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the welfare and safety of the citizens of the state when 
such persons choose to operate a motor vehicle while in 
that condition, and the legislature has just as legitimate 
an interest in enacting a statute making such persons 
criminally liable without a showing of criminal intent 
since such would still be a "public welfare offense" stat-
ute. See People of the State of New York v. Calcasola, 
349 N. Y. S. 2d 958 (1973), wherein the court found an 
operator of a motor vehicle whose ability to operate the 
vehicle impaired by use of prescribed methadone in vio-
lation of the New York statute. 
Thus, appellant submits that Section 41-6-44.2, supra, 
is clearly not unconstitutional merely because a criminal 
intent element is not specified therein. 
POINT II. 
ALTHOUGH UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.2 
(SUPP. 1973), NEED NOT INCLUDE A RE-
QUIREMENT OF CRIMINAL INTENT TO 
REMAIN CONSTITUTIONAL (SEE POINT 
I), THE UTAH LEGISLATURE HAS EN-
ACTED A GENERAL CRIMINAL INTENT 
STATUTE WHICH APPLIES TO STATUTES 
SUCH AS SECTION 41-6-44.2, SUPRA, 
WHICH DO NOT SPECIFICALLY CON-
TAIN A CRIMINAL INTENT ELEMENT 
THEREBY PROVIDING SUCH STATUTES 
WITH AN INTENT ELEMENT. 
The opinion of the First District Court assumes that 
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if criminal intent is not specifically mentioned in a crim-
inal offense statute, the statute is unconstitutional. I t 
was demonstrated in Point I that there is no constitu-
tional requirement or doctrine of mens rea. The conclu-
sion in Point I is further reinforced by the fact that the 
Utah Legislature, in enacting the new Criminal Code in 
1973, specifically provided for "strict liability" offenses. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101 (Supp. 1973). However, 
in enacting this Code Section, the Utah Legislature also 
stated (for purposes of construction only) that in Utah 
all offenses which are not specifically designated as strict 
liability offenses should require a "culpable mental state" 
or mens rea. Section 76-2-101, supra, provides as follows: 
"Requirements of criminal conduct and 
criminal responsibility. — No person is guilty 
of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited 
by law and: 
(1) H e acts intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly or with criminal negligence with 
respect to each element of the offense as the 
definition of the offense requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense in-
volving strict liability." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (Supp. 1973), further pro-
vides: 
"Every offense not involving strict lia-
bility shall require a culpable mental state, 
and when the definition of the offense does not 
specify a culpable mental state, intent, know-
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ledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish 
criminal responsibility. An offense shall involve 
strict liability only when a statute defining 
the offense clearly indicates a legislative pur-
pose to impose strict liability for the conduct 
by use of the phrase 'strict liability' or other 
terms of similar import." (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, although the Legislature required that each offense 
not specifically designated a strict liability offense have 
a culpable mental state element, the legislature did not 
go so far as to require that each statute defining a non-
strict liability criminal offense specifically contain a mens 
rea element. Instead, Section 76-2-102, supra, was en-
acted as a general mens rea provision to be used in con-
junction with, applied to, and read together with those 
non-strict liability statutes lacking an intent provision. 
Section 76-2-102, supra, thus, applies much like Utah's 
attempt statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (Supp. 1973), 
which is read together with other criminal statutes to 
provide all of the elements of a particular attempt crime. 
For example, the crime of attempted burglary is found 
by reading Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, supra, together 
with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (Supp. 1973). 
The remaining question is whether Sections 76-2-101 
and 102, supra, apply to Title 41 of the Code, or whether 
they only govern the construction of the Criminal Code, 
Title 76. 
The answer to this question is found in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-103 (Supp. 1973): 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
"Application of code—Offense prior to 
effective date.--(I) The provisions of this 
code shall govern the construction of, the pun-
ishment for, and defenses against any offense 
defined in this code or, except where otherwise 
specifically provided or the context otherwise 
requires, any offense defined outside this code; 
provided such offense was committed after the 
effective date of this code. 
(2) Any offense committed prior to the 
effective date of this code shall be governed 
by the law, statutory and non-statutory, exist-
ing at the time of commission thereof, except 
that a defense or limitation on punishment 
available under this code shall be available to 
any defendant tried or retried after the effec-
tive date. An offense under the laws of this 
state shall be deemed to have been committed 
prior to the effective date of this act if any of 
the elements of the offense occurred prior 
thereto." (Emphasis added.) 
In other words, unless otherwise specifically provided 
or the context otherwise requires, any offense, committed 
after the effective date of the Criminal Code and defined 
elsewhere in the Utah Code, shall be governed by the 
provisions of the Criminal Code in respect to the con-
struction of, the punishment for, and defenses against 
such offenses. 
Therefore, Section 76-2-102, supra, may be read to-
gether with Section 41-6-44.2, supra, since the latter sec-
tion does not specify a culpable mental state nor does 
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it specifically designate a strict liability offense, and it 
must be proved that the defendant acted intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly in order to obtain a conviction. 
In other words, one of the enumerated forms of mental 
culpability, listed in Section 76-2-102, supra, must be 
proved in connection with the conduct prohibited in Sec-
tion 41-6-44.2, supra. 
Therefore, Judge Christofferson wrongly interpreted 
Section 41-6-44.2, supra, as having eliminated any crim-
inal intent or knowledge as a necessary element of the 
crime since Section 76-2-102, supra, provides Section 41-
6-44.2, supra, with an intent element. Thus, the lower 
court judge's declaration that the statute is unconstitu-
tional for lack of an intent element is untenable. 
POINT III. 
SECTION 41-6-44.2, SUPRA, DOES EXPRESS 
SOME RELATION BETWEEN BLOOD AL-
COHOL CONTENT AND AN ACT OF THE 
PERSON CHARGED. 
Part of Judge Christofferson's Memorandum Deci-
sion provides that "there must be stated in the statute 
some relation of the blood alcohol content being .10 per-
cent or greater to some act of the person so charged, such 
as the drinking of intoxicating liquor." As was expressed 
in Point I, it is unclear whether this holding declares 
Section 41-6-44.2, supra, unconstitutional because it alleg-
edly does not require an act of a person to constitute 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
a crime, or whether the statute is unconstitutional for 
lack of a mens rea element. Points I and II discuss and 
resolve the latter interpretation. It is the purpose of this 
Point to resolve the former construction of the court's 
holding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2(a), supra} reads: "It 
is unlawful and punishable as provided in subsection (b) 
of this section for any person with a blood alcohol content 
of .10 percent or greater, by weight, to drive or be in 
actual physical control of any vehicle within this state." 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is clear from reading this statute that the act 
which must be performed by a person to constitute a 
violation of this statute is to be in "actual physical con-
trol of" or "to drive" a vehicle while the person has a 
blood alcohol content of .10 percent or greater. Two 
elements of the crime which must be proved are the blood 
alcohol content of the person, and whether he was in 
actual physical control of the vehicle. This reading of 
the statute shows that there must be an act done while 
in a certain condition to constitute a violation. There-
fore, the lower court's determination that the statute is 
unconstitutional because it lacks some relation of the 
blood alcohol content to some act of the person charged 
is erroneous and unfounded. 
POINT IV. 
CONTRARY TO THE LOWER COURT'S DE-
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CISION, SECTION 41-6-44.2, SUPRA, IS NOT 
VOID FOR VAGUENESS. 
While it is not clear from the Memorandum Decision 
of Judge Christofferson what basis there is for saying 
that Section 41-6-44.2, supra, is vague, the Court declared 
"the statute is unconstitutional for vagueness." The stat-
ute, on its face, is manifestly clear. It reads: 
"I t is unlawful . . . for any person with 
a blood alcohol content of .10% or greater, by 
weight, to drive or be in actual physical control 
of any vehicle in the state." 
This Court laid down the standard for judging the 
uncertainty or vagueness of a statute in State v. Packard, 
122 Utah 369, 250 P. 2d 561 (1952): 
" I t must be sufficiently definite (a) to 
inform persons of ordinary intelligence, who 
would be law abiding, what their conduct must 
be to conform to its requirements; (b) to ad-
vise a defendant accused of violating it just 
what constitutes the offense with which he is 
charged, and (c) to be susceptible of uniform 
interpretation and application by those charged 
with responsibility of applying and enforcing 
it." Id. at 376. 
In applying these standards to the statute in question, 
it is clear that a person of ordinary intelligence would 
know that if his blood alcohol content is .10 percent and 
he drives his car while in this condition, he may be pun-
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ished. It may be contended that a person cannot tell 
when his blood alcohol content is .10 percent, but this 
is a specious argument for several reasons. First of all, 
he knows if he has been drinking at all that he should 
exercise caution. Secondly, it is possible to correlate a 
certain number of drinks of various types of alcoholic 
beverages with a certain blood alcohol level and this in-
formation is available and is advertised frequently (see 
Point V). Thirdly, if a person really is concerned he can 
obtain his own balloon test mechanism and test himself. 
In respect to standard (b) above, the offense is driv-
ing or being in actual physical control of a vehicle in the 
state with the requisite blood alcohol level. It is clear 
this language adequately advises of the offense. 
Standard (c) is met since the blood alcohol content 
level to constitute the offense is the same for everyone 
and the person must be in control of a vehicle. In fact, 
this statute is susceptible of more uniform interpretation 
and application than most criminal statutes since it is 
so precise. It is clear from an examination of this statute 
that it meets or exceeds all of the requirements set forth 
by this Court to sustain its validity. 
POINT V. 
SECTION 41-6-44.2, SUPRA, IS CONSTITU-
TIONAL SINCE THE LEGISLATURE HAD 
A RATIONAL BASIS FOR MAKING UN-
LAWFUL AND CRIMINALLY PUNISH-
ABLE THE CONDUCT OF DRIVING OR 
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BEING IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL 
OF A VEHICLE WHILE HAVING A BLOOD 
ALCOHOL CONTENT OF .10 PERCENT OR 
GREATER. 
The basic question to be answered here is whether 
the legislature has the power to enact such a statute. The 
general principle regarding the legislature's power to 
define criminal offenses is as follows: 
"The legislative power of a state or the 
federal government covers every subject of 
legitimate legislation except so far as it is 
limited by constitutional provisions. There-
fore, the legislature has the power to define 
what acts shall constitute criminal offenses . . . 
and generally to enact all laws deemed expedi-
ent for the protection of public and private 
rights and the prevention and punishment of 
public wrongs, the expediency of making any 
such enactment being a matter of which the 
legislature is the proper judge." 1 Wharton's 
Criminal Law and Procedure (Anderson Ed.) 
§ 16, p. 25. 
The Supreme Court of Utah expressed their accept-
ance of the aforementioned principal in Brim v. Jones, 
11 Utah 200, 39 P. 825, affd, 165 U. S. 180 (1895): 
" I t is in the discretion of the legislature 
to regulate the use of the highways. . . . " Id. 
at 826. 
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See also Bamberger Transp. Co. v. Public Service Comm.9 
115 Utah 274, 204 P. 2d 163, 165 (1949). 
The Court articulated the parameters of the legisla-
tive power to enact driving while intoxicated statutes in 
State v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P. 2d 1075 (1959), 
as follows: 
"If the legislature sees fit to single out 
the unlawful act of driving while intoxicated 
as being in a special classification, we think 
it is within their legislative prerogative to do 
so." Id. at 1078. 
Furthermore, this Court stated in State v. Brermany 13 
Utah 2d 195, 371 P. 2d 27, 29 (1962), that "it is within 
the prerogative of the legislature to make it unlawful for 
one to drive a vehicle while under the influence of liquor 
99 
It is therefore apparent that the Utah State Legis-
lature can enact driving under the influence of alcohol 
legislation. The United States Supreme Court defines 
the presumptions to be afforded to statutes of proper 
legislative subjects in South Carolina State Highway 
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 82 L. Ed. 734, 58 
S. Ct. 510, reh. den., 303 U. S 667, 82 L Ed. 1124, 58 S. 
Ct. 510 (1938): 
"When the action of the legislature is with-
in the scope of its power, fairly debatable ques-
tions as to its reasonableness, wisdom, and 
priority are not for the determination of courts, 
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but for the legislative body, on which rests the 
duty and responsibility of decision. . . Being a 
legislative judgment it is presumed to be sup-
ported by facts known to the legislature unless 
facts judicially known or proved preclude that 
possibility." Id. at 517. 
In Railway Express Agency v. People of State of 
New York, 336 U. S. 106, 69 S. Ct. 463, 93 L. Ed. 533 
(1949), the appellant challenged a traffic regulation 
which was enacted to protect the safety of the public in 
the use of the streets. The court held as follows: 
"We do not sit to weigh evidence on the 
due process issue in order to determine whether 
the regulation is sound or appropriate; nor is 
it our function to pass judgment on its wis-
dom. . . We would be trespassing on one of the 
most intensly local and specialized of all muni-
cipal problems if we held that this regulation 
had no relation to the traffic problem of New 
York City. I t is the judgment of the local 
authorities that it does have such a relation." 
M a t 465. 
Finally, the foundational precepts regarding the con-
stitutionality of a legislative act were articulated in 
Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co., 18 
Utah 2d 45, 414 P. 2d 963 (1966), as follows: 
" . . . that all presumptions favor validity; 
that courts will strike down such an act with 
reluctance and only where that is clearly neces-
sary; and that in case of uncertainty the act 
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should be construed so that it will be constitu-
tional whenever that reasonably can be done." 
Id. at 47. 
The object sought to be attained by Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supra, is a reduction in alcohol related 
highway accidents. This object and its relation to blood 
alcohol content was recognized in Breithaupt v. Abram, 
352 U. S. 432 (1957), by the following observation: 
"The test (to determine alcohol content) 
upheld here is not attacked on the ground of 
any basic deficiency or of injudicious applica-
tion, but admittedly is a scientifically accurate 
method of detecting alchol content in the 
blood, thus furnishing an exact measure upon 
which to base a decision as to intoxication. 
Modern community living requires modern 
scientific methods of crime detection lest the 
public go unprotected. The increasing slaugh-
ter on our highways, most of which should be 
avoided, now reaches the astounding figures 
only heard of on the battlefield. The States, 
through safety measures, modern scientific 
methods, and strict enforcement of traffic laws, 
are using all reasonable means to make auto-
mobile driving less dangerous." Id, at 439. 
One means selected by the Utah State Legislature to 
attain the object of reducing alcohol related highway 
accidents was to define being "under the influence" in 
terms of blood alcohol level in a concentration of 0.10 
percent by weight. That the established level is reason-
able cannot seriously be questioned. 
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The Public Information Programs on Alcohol and 
Highway Safety (1972), point out that "people don't 
seem to realize (that) it takes an enormous amount of 
liquor to get to 0.10'' and that "drinking behavior very 
rarely reaches the level of those arrested for drunk driv-
ing." 
In Public Information Programs on Alcohol and 
Highway Safety (1972), which is a collection of proceed-
ings of a national conference of governmental, commer-
cial and involuntary organizations, the following was 
emphasized: 
"The Department of Transportation . . . 
is soliciting public support of efforts to obtain 
uniform legislation in the various states, fixing 
a blood alcohol level of 0.10 as presumptive of 
intoxication." Id. at 37. 
In 5 Journal of Safety Research (1973), a National 
Safety Council Publication, it was pointed out that 
Europeans feel that the United States permissible stan-
dard for blood alcohol content is "ludicrously liberal." 
In Sweden, when a driver is apprehended with a mere 
0.05 percent blood alcohol content there is a mandatory 
two year license revocation, three months imprisonment, 
and insurance cancellation. The higher Brtish standard 
of 0.08 percent blood alcohol content carries with it a 
fine of 100 pounds and a one year suspension of the mo-
torist's driver's license or up to four months in jail, or 
both. 
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A recently published American Medical Association 
manual, which tabulates the results of 36 studies con-
ducted from 1934 through 1965 to determine the rela-
tionship between blood alcohol levels and driving ability 
concludes: 
"I t is apparent that impairment in some 
drivers commence at a low level and 0.04 per-
cent w/v (40 mg./lOO ml) seems to be the 
threshold. Of equal importance is the rapid in-
crease in involvement in accidents and deterior-
ation of driving skill at levels of 0.08 percent 
w/v (8 mg/100 ml) and above. Based on all 
these data there is no question but that there 
is epidemiological evidence of an association 
between blood alcohol levels and the likelihood 
of being involved in a vehicular accident." 
Alcohol and the Impaired Driver, American 
Medical Association publication, 01-86 G; 170-
2M; OP-288 (1970), at page 58. 
Leading researchers on alcohol and traffic safety, 
including R. N. Harger, Henry Newman, Herman Heise, 
T. A. Loomis, Leonard Goldberg, D. W. Penner and H. 
W. Smith, concluded as follows: 
"It is the opinion of this committee that 
a blood alcohol concentration of .05% will 
definitely impair the driving ability of some 
individuals, and as blood alcohol concentration 
increases, a progressively hightr proportion of 
such individuals are so affected, until at a blood 
alcohol concentration of .10% all individuals 
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are definitely impaired." Alcohol and the Im-
paired Driver: A manual on the Medicolegal 
Aspects of Chemical Tests for Intoxication; 
Committee on Medicolegal Problems, Ameri-
can Medical Association. 1968. p. 146. 
The debates of the 1973 Utah State Legislature re-
garding the merit of H. B. 56 which was later codified 
as Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2 (Supp. 1973), indicate 
that the Legislature realized and acted upon the rational 
scientific and medical connection between a driver's blood 
alcohol content and his likelihood of being involved in 
a traffic accident. The bill received bi-partisan support 
and was overwhelmingly approved in both houses. See 
House Journal 211 > 560 (1973), and Senate Journal 531 
(1973). 
The chief sponsor of H. B. 56, Rep. Lynn M. Hilton, 
spoke in favor of the bill before the House of Representa-
tives on January 24, 1973, and before the Senate on Feb-
ruary 15, 1973. Rep. Hilton stated that state and national 
surveys indicated that one-half of all traffic accidents are 
alcohol related and that H. B. 56 was designed to increase 
highway safety and in turn reduce the number of traffic 
fatalities and injuries. The prohibited 0.10 percent blood 
alcohol content level was medically and scientifically 
shown to be rational and proper by the following analysis 
presented by Rep. Hilton and with the aid of the State 
Department of Public Safety. 
The Representative stated that a blood alcohol con-
tent of .02 percent was likely to cause poor driving habits* 
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A blood alcohol content of .05 percent will affect the 
judgment and decision time of most drivers. A blood 
alcohol content of .08 percent will limit the vision and 
coordination of drivers and further distort judgment and 
decision time. Finally, when the blood alcohol content 
reaches the .10 percent level, all physical and mental 
functions of all drivers are adversely affected. 
On January 24, 1973, Rep. Richard P. Lindsay 
indicated that there was a demonstrated cause and effect 
relationship between the level of blood alcohol and the 
increased possibility of being involved in a traffic acci-
dent. The representative presented several charts which 
were prepared in connection with the State Department 
of Public Safety which demonstrated that the probability 
of a traffic mishap greatly increased when a driver had 
.10 percent or above blood alcohol content. 
In conclusion, it has long been judicially recognized 
that it is a legislative prerogative to regulate the high-
ways. Thus, the legislature may constitutionally use the 
police power to make it unlawful for one to drive a ve-
hicle while under the influence of alcohol, and in turn 
promote the safety and welfare of the citizens of the 
State. After the passage of such legislation, it is not the 
judicial function to determine whether the measure is 
sound or appropriate, but merely to determine whether 
the legislature felt that the regulation had some rational 
relation to the traffic probem. It is evident that the sci-
entific, medical, legal and judicial authorities agree that 
a blood alcohol concentration of .10 percent will definitely 
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impair the driving abilities of all drivers. It is therefore 
safe to conclude that there is a rational connection be-
tween Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supra, and the Utah 
State Legislature's decision to term such conduct crim-
inal. 
POINT VI. 
THE LOWER COURT JUDGE VIOLATED 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCED-
URE AND ALSO ABUSED HIS DISCRE-
TION WHEN HE GRANTED THE RELIEF 
PRAYED FOR BY THE PLAINTIFF WITH-
OUT A HEARING AND WITHOUT A MO-
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
As the statement of facts describes, the plaintiff-
respondent in this case filed a complaint which was an-
swered by the defendant-appellant with a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted. Plaintiff filed a memorandum in response 
to the motion to dismiss and the parties awaited a de-
cision on the motion. The court then, instead of ruling 
on defendant's motion, granted the relief prayed for by 
the plaintiff by ruling on the merits of the case in a mem-
orandum decision, which amounted to summary judg-
ment in plaintiff's behalf. At no time did plaintiff file 
a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, or a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings under Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. In fact, the response to defendant's motion to 
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dismiss by plaintiff prayed that the motion to dismiss be 
denied. It did not ask for a judgment on the pleadings 
or on the merits of the case. 
It is clear that a Rule 12(b) (6), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, motion to dismiss for failure to stay a claim 
may be construed, in certain circumstances, as a motion 
for summary judgment under Rule 56,supra. However, 
that motion was made by defendant and that motion was 
apparently denied (although it was never formally ruled 
on). Rule 56, supra, further entitles parties to move 
for summary judgment and the court may grant such a 
motion, but only if "the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law/' Rule 56(c), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. So, even if defendant's Section 12 (b) 
(6) motion could be treated as a Rule 56 motion for sum-
mary judgment, only the moving party (defendant) could 
be granted summary judgment absent the filing of a 
similar motion by plaintiff, which would thereby make 
him a moving party also. 
The harm which has arisen in this particular case 
from the court's disregarding these procedures is that 
defendant-appellant was not afforded the opportunity to 
completely argue the merits of his case and all of the 
issues were not fully presented to the court before Judge 
Christofferson rendered his Memorandum Decision. If, 
in fact, the plaintiff-respondent had filed a motion for 
summary judgment, the defendant would have been en-
titled to respond to that motion. Then all of the grounds 
upon which summary judgment could be based could 
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have been argued. Rule 12(b), supra, seems to contem-
plate a full airing of the issues if a motion to dismiss is 
treated as a motion for summary judgment. The last 
sentence of that rule concludes, " . . . all parties shall be 
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." 
Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, further pro-
vides that "all pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice." Appellant submits that the court's 
construction of his motion to dismiss as one for summary 
judgment (if that is in fact what was done) did not do 
substantial justice, but precluded appellant from fully 
presenting his case. 
A further complication arises because the parties in 
this case were deprived of any hearing on the matter. 
Rule 13(D) of the First District Court (see Appendix 
No. 1), reads: 
"Decisions shall be rendered without oral 
argument unless oral argument is requested 
by the court, in which event the Clerk shall set 
a day and time for hearing such argument." 
(Emphasis added.) 
It appears from this rule that only the court rather than 
the parties can request a hearing on a motion. The harsh-
ness of such a rule needs little explanation. In the pres-
ent case, the ruling of the court, pursuant to the Court's 
Rule 13, which did not allow a hearing, constituted a 
final judgment on the merits of the case. 
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Finally, it may be argued that appellant was given 
due notice that the court could render a "decision" on the 
merits of the case without a hearing based upon the 
language of the First District Court's Rule 13(D), which 
was mailed to appellant at the outset of the proceedings. 
However, the heading of Rule 13 is entitled "ORDER 
PERTAINING TO LAW AND MOTION" and a read-
ing of the entire Rule leads the reader to conclude that 
the rule deals only with the court's procedure on treat-
ing and disposing of motions and that the term "decisions" 
in subparagraph (D) refers only to "decisions" on all 
motions being made by the court without oral argument 
unless oral argument is requested by the court. Thus, 
appellant awaited the court's ruling on his motion to 
dismiss never anticipating that the court would render 
a "decision" adverse to him on the entire merits of the 
case. 
Based on above analysis as well as the concept that 
parties are entitled to a full hearing in order to satisfy 
the requirements of justice and due process, appellant 
contends that the court violated the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and abused its discretion by handling this 
case as it did. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44.2 (Supp. 1973), is constitutional for the follow-
ing reasons: 
1. There is no constitutional requirement that a 
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criminal statute require criminal intent as an element. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (Supp. 1973), "lends" 
an intent element to Section 41-6-44.2, supra, thereby 
eliminating the argument that the latter statute lacks 
such an element. 
3. Section 41-6-44.2, supra, does express some re-
lation between blood alcohol content and an act of the 
accused. 
4. Section 41-6-44.2, supra, is not void for vague-
ness. 
5. The Utah Legislature had a rational basis for 
making the conduct described in Section 41-6-44.2, supra, 
criminal in nature. 
For the above reasons, the lower court's decision 
declaring the Code Section in question unconstitutional 
is improper and should be reversed. 
In the alternative, appellant submits that since he 
was never afforded a full and complete hearing on the 
merits of the case by the lower court, at the very least 
he is entitled to have the case remanded to the lower 
court so that such a hearing may be obtained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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APPENDIX NO. I 
NO. 13 
IN T H E DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE, 
BOX ELDER, & RICH COUNTIES 
ORDER PERTAINING TO 
LAW AND MOTION 
(A) All motions shall be accompanied by points 
and authorities and any affidavits relied upon. 
(B) Responding party shall file and serve upon 
all parties within ten days after service of a motion 
answering points and authorities and counter affidavits. 
(C) Moving party may serve and file reply points 
and authorities within five days after service of respond-
ing party's points and authorities. Upon the expiration 
of such five day period to file reply points and authori-
ties, the Clerk shall submit the matter to the Court for 
decision. 
(D) Decisions shall be rendered without oral 
argument unless oral argument is requested by the court, 
in which event the Clerk shall set a date and time for 
hearing such argument. 
(E) In all cases where the granting of a motion 
would dispose of the action on the merits with prejudice, 
the party resisting the motion may request oral argu-
ment to the court. If no such request is made, ,oral 
arguments will be deemed to have been waived. 
Dated August 4, 1970. 
Venoy Christofferson 
District Judge 
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